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There are several major difficulties in deconstructing the relationship between French and European 
defence and security policy. The first, and most obvious, is that European  policy, in so far as it exists, 
is largely French in conception and impulsion. This has  been the case virtually since 19441. However, 
and this is the second difficulty,  incitements from Paris for Europe to "get its security act together", 
sustained and  imperative though they have tended to be, are not necessarily paralleled by a tangible  
Europeanisation of French defence policy and planning. This leads to the third problem:  the shortfall 
between discourse and reality. An uninformed observer called upon to read  the major documents, texts 
and speeches emanating over the last few years from the  command centres of French defence planning 
(Elysée, Matignon and rue Saint  Dominique2) might be forgiven for believing that French and 
European defence  policy were largely coterminous3. To an appreciable extent, France acts on defence 
and security policy as if it were acting for the whole of Europe. In large part, this is because France has 
a long historical tradition of calling the shots across the continent and there is no doubt that, in terms of 
resource inputs, military and industrial capacity and grandiose visions for the future,  France is in a 
class of her own. But therein lies at least one problem. To put it at its most neutral, France's defence 
thinking on certain key  issues (such as nuclear policy, alliance policy, resourcing and conscription) is 
visibly  out of phase with that of the majority of her European partners. Where this is so, Paris  tends to 
turn a blind eye and assume that "Europe" will sooner or later step in line.  There is little doubt that 
France sees herself as playing the leading role in pushing  European defence policy forward. Few 
would disagree. It remains to be seen how far  she will prove successful in steering the continent along 
her own chosen course.   
 
1. The 1980s and the emergence of "Europeanisation"   
 
The Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s was instrumental in ressuscitating both the  vision and the 
reality of a "European defence entity" which had been moribund, along  with the Western European 
Union (WEU), ever since the 1950s. The differences of  opinion between Europe and Washington over 
key aspects of foreign policy, and  particularly over policy with regard to the Soviet bloc, persuaded 
most European  leaders that the time had come to think afresh about the long-delayed European pillar  
of the Alliance. Although President Mitterrand had stood resolutely shoulder to shoulder  with 
Washington over the Euromissile crisis itself, France was undoubtedly the driving force in the gradual 
revival of WEU through a series of important meetings leading to the  "Platform on European Security 
Interests" signed at The Hague in October 19874. This  endogenous dimension to the process was 
probably best typified by Franco-German  defence cooperation, which intensified throughout the 1980s, 
notably through the  establishment of a Franco-German Defence Commission (1982) and then Council  
(1988) as well as the launch of the Franco-German brigade (1989)5. It was on French  insistence, with 
German backing, that a clause was inserted into the Maastricht Treaty  (Title V., Article J.4) 
establishing a common foreign and security policy dealing with "all  questions related to the security of 
the Union, including the eventual framing of a common  defence policy which might in time lead to a 
common defence." The WEU was designated  "an integral part of the development of the Union" and 
requested "to elaborate and  implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications".  Clearly, there is an objective symbiosis between French and European defence  
planning. This symbiosis developed strongly throughout the 1980s under the twin  impulses of a 
resurgent Europe and an American leadership which appeared to be  switching its strategic priorities 
away from Europe to the Pacific rim.  This process of "objective Europeanisation" should nevertheless 
be kept in perspective.  Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the emphasis was on streamlining the 
European  Pillar of NATO, rather than on any attempt to produce a West European "Sinatra  doctrine" in defence or security policy6. The 1987 WEU "Platform" drawn up at The  Hague was a brave attempt 
to maintain the fundamentals of a NATO-based security  system, while reasserting the rights and 
responsibilities of the European nations under  the modified Brussels Treaty. Close coupling with the 
United States remained at the heart  of the doctrine - which was predicated upon the persistence of a 
massive and identifiable  threat from the East. This effectively ruled out any attempt to rethink the 
bases of  European security.   It was the collapse of the Cold War system (not to mention the Warsaw 
Pact and indeed  the USSR itself) which provided an exogenous and qualitatively new impetus towards 
Europeanisation, synchronising with the endogenous Maastricht process outlined above.  The French 
took an early lead in arguing, from within and without NATO, that the  Alliance should undergo a 
fundamental review, beginning with a political analysis of  the new world situation and leading on 
from that analysis to a shift in strategic approach  and military planning. At an important meeting with 
George Bush at Key Largo, Florida  on 19 April 1990, François Mitterrand proposed the convening, 
towards the end of that  year, of a NATO summit intended to initiate a grand strategic review based on 
a new  world-political analysis. It was not coincidental that, on the very same day, the French  
President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl formulated their joint proposals on EMU and EPU,  including 
the proposal that Europe should "define and implement a common foreign and  security policy"7. In 
the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Washington  and Paris both argued in favour of 
strategic review, but in quite different ways. In the  confused situation of these years, there were many 
crossed wires, a considerable degree  of mutual misunderstanding and excessive polarisation of 
positions. The French appeared  to be pressing for a radical restructuring of NATO, based on a reduced 
political role for  the Alliance and concomitant eventual military adjustments, accompanied by the  
emergence of an increasingly autonomous European security entity and a significantly  increased role 
for CSCE8. Washington's position implied continued American political  hegemony over a possibly 
extended Alliance, accompanied by rapid military changes  within NATO, intended in part to reassure 
Moscow. Analysts had a field day  commenting on the cut and thrust of this very public shadow-
boxing. However,  history conspired to reduce the "French agenda" to a sideshow. The collapse of the  
Soviet centre put paid to any French hopes of projecting CSCE to centre stage. The Gulf  War removed 
any doubt as to which country in the world could aspire to the status of a  military superpower. And the 
Yugoslav debacle called critically into question the European  Union's capacity to conduct even a 
unified let alone an autonomous regional security  policy. While George Bush remained in the White 
House, Atlantic relations followed a  course of "Business as Usual".   The advent of a new American 
leadership (of a new generation) in the person of Bill Clinton produced a new situation. The NATO 
summit in January 1994 constituted a  breakthrough in trans-Atlantic relations in that, for the fist time 
ever, it gave positive  encouragement to the emergence of the European security entity called for in the  
Maastricht Treaty and even welcomed the notion of a common European defence  policy9. For the 
Europeans, and particularly for the French, there seemed to be  everything to play for, particularly in 
the perspective of the 1996 Intergovernmental  Review Conference (IGC). Only months after the 
NATO summit, the French government  published a major defence review in the shape of a Livre 
Blanc (the first since 1972) and  this was rapidly followed up by a new defence programme law (loi de 
programmation  militaire - LPM) covering the period 1995-2000. The cardinal feature of both those  
major documents is, at least on the surface, Europeanisation.   In what follows, I shall attempt to show 
how French defence structures, concepts and  policy have changed, particularly in very recent years, as 
a result of this European  agenda. The first point to note in this regard is the constant public reiteration 
of the  equivalence between French and European security policy. In his Preface to the 1994  Livre 
Blanc, prime minister Edouard Balladur noted that, "with the coming into effect of  the Treaty on 
European Union, our defence policy must in fact contribute to the gradual  construction of a common 
European defence". In his speech to the IHEDN on 8  September 1994, Balladur highlighted this 
objective as "one of our main ambitions in  the coming years". A French contribution to the 
construction of a common European  defence is not exactly the same thing as the "Europeanisation" of 
French national  defence planning. But Defence Minister François L‚otard went further: France's aim, 
he  insisted, was to create a European defence "not by playing off one State against another,  but by 
bringing about, for the first time in the tormented history of this old continent, a  mutualisation of 
power, in the service of the defence of Europe and of a common  security for the States engaged in its 
construction. This ambition lies at the heart of  the new White Paper [...] In the long run, its 
consequences are considerable" (p.10).  They certainly sound "considerable", but what exactly is meant 
by "mutualisation of  power"? During the parliamentary debate on the LPM 1995-2000, a succession of deputies, many of them with impeccable Gaullist credentials, outdid one another in  asserting that 
France's defence policy had to be tightly meshed with that of Europe10.  The White Paper itself notes 
that "the maintenance of France's rank in the world will be in  large measure linked to her ability to 
influence the construction of Europe and its future  evolution" (p.52). There is little doubt about the 
message behind the discourse. France  wishes Europe to adopt what Paris conceives of as a European 
security policy. How far  has France herself changed in order to help this process along?  For a nation 
which, ever since the 1960s, has prided itself on what was presented as a  growing political consensus 
on the Gaullist precepts of national independence and  non-integration into multilateral defence 
structures, the implications of the new  approach appear on the surface to be very far-reaching in a 
number of significant  areas. These include: command structures and intelligence gathering; force 
structures  and operational missions; bilateral and multilateral integration; the armaments industry and  
defence procurement; transport and logistics. At the same time, there are very clear limits  to the extent 
to which genuine Europeanisation of French defence policy is actually taking  place - or indeed can 
actually take place. Among factors imposing such limits are the  complexity of the international 
situation, the differences in security vision between  France and her European partners, and residual 
complexities of a purely domestic  nature to do with the idiosyncracies of French political culture.    
 
2. The "Europeanisation" of French Defence Policy   
 
One of the main underlying rationales behind this European discourse is the conceptual  shift from 
"defence policy" per se, with its overwhelmingly military implications, to a  broader definition of 
security involving economic and industrial policy as well as  diplomatic, cultural, educational and 
many other dimensions. The principal sources  of tension in the post-Cold War world are now seen in 
France as stemming from  structural disequilibria between the rich areas of the world and the poor.  
Interdependence is perceived not simply as a feature of the economic and industrial systems of the 
advanced market economies, but also as a desirable  foundation stone for regional and international 
stability. Where previously, both prior  to the nuclear age and throughout the Cold War, it was simple 
to define and thereby to  plan for the protection of "vital national interests", in the post-Cold War world, 
it is  recognised that such threats and risks as do exist stem much more from indirect  causes such as 
economic chaos, social and demographic destabilisation and the  political upheaval such problems 
inevitably generate. Moreover, these risks are  recognised as shared, primarily by France's immediate 
EU partners: "In an increasing  number of cases [...] France's interests and those of her Western 
neighbours and  partners are barely distinguishable" (p.48). "It cannot be ruled out that, as the  interests 
of the European nations converge, France's conception of her vital interests  will eventually coincide 
with that of her neighbours" (p.49) But the new feature of this  approach to security is that these 
mutual interests are also shared by the EU with the  regions on its periphery such as Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean  seaboard. "It is in our interest to engage [with the 
Mediterranean countries] in  economic, political and cultural relations which will help them to [...] 
reduce political  tensions and the reasons behind emigration. In this case, a good cooperation policy is 
our  best guarantee of security"11. Where defence, at the end of the day, was more or less  infinitely 
divisible, security is recognised as essentially indivisible. For this reason,  according to the Livre Blanc, 
"France will act, in most circumstances, within the  framework of her alliances and in the context of a 
community of interests between  Europeans" (p.52). The problem with this approach is that, 
programmatically as well as  doctrinally, France now has to tread a very fine line between her own 
national interests  and those of her European partners. In the following sections, I shall examine the  
evolution of French defence preparations under five main heads: nuclear doctrine;  overall strategic 
doctrine; conventional force integration and projection; the defence  industry and procurement policy; 
institutional and organisational adjustments.    
 
2.1. Nuclear Doctrine.  
 
Stuart Croft has examined elsewhere in this volume the general problems involved in moving towards 
a European nuclear policy. For France, with its traditional insistence  on independence and autonomy, 
that problem is even more difficult than for the UK. An  analysis of the "nuclear debate" in France is 
revealing both of the extent and of the  limitations of doctrinal evolution in this sphere12. References 
to the nuclear future  in French strategic discourse invariably carry a dichotomous message: nuclear weapons  remain the backbone of France's strictly national defence; but they represent, in the  post-
Wall world, a different strategic currency, and one which is bound to evolve13.  The most obvious 
element of "evolution" is their potential Europeanisation. Ever since  January 1992 when François 
Mitterrand first performed what Ian Davidson described as a  "classic strip-tease" act by delicately 
lifting one corner of a veil on the notion of a  "European nuclear deterrence", there have been regular 
winks and nods from various  quarters14. The 1994 Livre Blanc states boldly that "the issue of a 
European nuclear  doctrine is destined to become one of the major questions in the construction of a  
common European defence [...] Indeed, with nuclear weapons, Europe's defence  autonomy is possible. 
Without them, it is out of the question." (p.98). Such a doctrine  is conceptually linked in the French 
mind to the development of a European identity. In  all "scenarios", it is generally considered to be at 
best a medium to long-term prospect. I  shall return to it shortly.  However, since 1989, there has also 
been another development on the nuclear front,  which has taken place without any reference to 
France's European partners. The main  issue has been the adaptation both of nuclear doctrine and of 
nuclear systems to the  hypothetical threat posed by various forms of unspecified (but presumably 
Third World)  state terrorism. Various specialists have recently advocated de facto reversal of France's  
traditional approach which insisted that nuclear weapons were not for use but were purely  political 
weapons designed to allow a "weak" state to deter a "strong" one (la dissuasion  du faible au fort). The 
new theories have reversed this dictum in order to conceptualise  the deterrence of the "strong" (France) 
against the "weak" (Irak? Libya?) by means, if  necessary, of precision nuclear attacks on the 
infrastructure of any hostile state  attempting to hold France (or the West?) to ransom (la dissuasion du 
fort au faible)15. David Yost has offered the useful distinction in this context between  those in France 
who are in favour of a "more operational" approach to nuclear issues and  those who stick to a "less 
operational" approach16. This shift in nuclear thinking  represents a fundamental break with traditional 
Gaullist precepts. Although in  1993-1994 Defence Minister L‚otard, Prime Minister Balladur and 
President Mitterrand  combined their efforts to reassert nuclear orthodoxy by blowing the whistle on 
the "more  operational" lobby17, rare were the apostles of restraint such as Pascal Boniface who  
situated the debate (and the problems it raised) in an overtly European context: "there  is a fundamental 
contradiction between the prospect of the Europeanisation of French  nuclear forces and the risk of 
shifting towards a nuclear policy which would no longer  be purely deterrent. Our European partners 
will not follow us in the direction of nuclear  use concepts which we have ourselves always rejected in 
the past"18. This is something  of an understatement! The prospect of the EU Fifteen reaching 
agreement on a plan to  launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike on, say, Tripoli is remote, to say the least. 
The  likelihood of such a doctrinal shift is difficult to guage, but one is forced to conclude  that a 
Chirac presidency would be more open to pressures in that direction, given the  declared support for 
"use theory" on the part of Chirac's main strategic adviser, Pierre  Lellouche. Such a move would, as 
Boniface has argued, make "Europeanisation" infinitely  more complicated.   However, French nuclear 
doctrine is being modified under the impetus of the European  debate in a number of other directions. 
Perhaps most intriguing is the development of the  notion of dissuasion par constat, which is usually 
translated (erroneously in the eyes of  its authors) as "existential deterrence". This notion was 
developed in the 1980s by a  number of "intellectual generals" such as Claude Leborgne and 
particularly  Charles-Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud19. The concept was defined explicitly in  order to 
offer an approach to nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine which might find a  receptive ear not only 
among the non-nuclear members of the European Union, but also in  Britain. It is predicated on the 
existence of a growing interdependence at every level  between the nuclear and non-nuclear states of 
the Union and therefore on the logical impossibility of identifying and specifying the "vital national 
interests" of any given state  (including France). It presupposes both the continued existence of nuclear 
weapons (and  nuclear weapon states) in the European theatre, but also the existence of serious  
conventional forces acting as a guarantee against surprise attack or nuclear  blackmail. The notion is 
developed at some length in Fricaud-Chagnaud's recent book  on French defence policy, whose 
provocative title - Mourir pour le Roi de Prusse? -  symbolically posits the starkness of the security 
option now facing France20. The  notion is presented as one which avoids the pitfalls of most other 
approaches to a  common European nuclear deterrence such as extended deterrence, concerted 
deterrence  or shared deterrence. It is, however, these other concepts which are most in evidence in  the 
various fora where these matters are actually discussed21.   The most significant of those fora is the 
Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear  Policy and Doctrine which was formally established as a 
permanent group in July 1993  after the London summit between François Mitterrand and John Major22. The commission,  composed of about five officials from each side, representing the two 
Defence and  Foreign Ministries, meets about three times a year, although the supporting group,  
responsible for drafting position papers, meets more regularly. Discussions have  focussed on two 
types of issues. First, there has been detailed mutual exploration of  each side's nuclear doctrine. 
Discussions have focussed on nuclear policies as they  currently exist, rather than on speculative shifts 
which may or may not take place.  This has given rise to the (apparently surprising) mutual recognition 
that, despite the  adversarial posturing of the Cold War period, the nuclear doctrines of the two 
countries  are in fact quite similar and indeed largely compatible. Second, discussion has taken place  
about topical issues of nuclear relevance such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Arms  Control and 
shifts in the nuclear doctrine of the other nuclear states. Research and  development and procurement 
issues have been excluded from the agenda. The  commission has liaised closely with French and 
British officials working within  NATO's Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP). The work of the 
commission is, of  course, classified but highly placed sources suggest that there has been an 
encouraging convergence of views in discussions about the conditions under which a "European  
deterrence" might acquire some political and operational meaning. In particular there  appears to have 
been considerable agreement, without attempting to enter into details or  definitions, around the notion 
that the "vital interests" of the main EU countries could  well prove to be compatible if not actually 
common. Officials insist that there has been  no discussion of specific hypothetical scenarios (such as 
the "Islamic threat"), but it is  difficult to imagine that such issues will remain "out of bounds". Above 
all, the  commission appears to have developed an excellent working relationship in which  both sides 
have discovered that the prospect of reaching serious agreement on nuclear  doctrine ought not to 
prove particularly problematic23.   Quite what all this amounts to in terms of a "Europeanisation" of 
France's traditional  insistence on the national dimension of the nuclear deterrent is not entirely clear.  
The fact remains that, from François Mitterrand to Jacques Delors, from Edouard  Balladur to Admiral 
Lanxade, from Alain Jupp‚ to François Fillon, from François L‚otard  to Jacques Chirac24, all 
prominent French officials regularly insist that France is willing  (and presumably able) to put its 
nuclear forces at the service of Europe. As David Yost  has concluded, "what is most striking is the 
extent to which French choices are likely to  be influenced by those made by other nations"25. On the 
nuclear front, the "debate",  precisely because it is the most difficult and the most sensitive, has only 
just begun.  But the fact that it has begun is indicative of the distance already covered from what is  
commmonly understood as "Gaullism". The logical corollary to this is a veritable  revolution in overall 
strategic doctrine.   
 
2.2. Strategic Doctrine  
 
Prior to 1994, the relationship between France's nuclear and her conventional weapons  was 
constructed around two strategic precepts. First, the doctrine of deterrence, born of  superpower 
confrontation and the nuclear stalemate, insisted on the notion of "no-war"  (non-guerre) or "refusal of 
battle" (refus de la bataille). For the French, the function  of nuclear weapons was to prevent wars, not 
to fight them. This was counterposed against the NATO doctrine of flexible response. The corollary of 
that first strategic  precept was the second: that conventional forces also were, in a variety of ways, 
linked  to the nuclear deterrent as a kind of trip-wire which prevented its being  "short-circuited". 
Conventional weapons also were intended to prevent wars  rather than to fight them. This relationship 
has, since 1994, changed radically. The Livre  Blanc itself makes this explicit. After speaking rather 
discretely of "certain conceptual  mutations" (p.89) and a "different balance" (p.90) in the respective 
place of nuclear and  conventional weapons, the chapter on defence strategy in effect opens up a 
radical new  approach. Since nuclear weapons are henceforth likely to play a significantly less central  
role in strategic planning, whereas conventional weapons are likely to be very much more  in evidence 
(and also in use), the relationship between the two has explicitly been  "inverted" (p.94). Indeed, the 
Livre Blanc even goes so far as to hint that,  whereas previously, conventional weapons were regarded 
as tactical support systems  for the strategic nuclear deterrent (neither of which was intended for use), 
today it is  conventional weapons which are regarded as strategic and, at one level at least, nuclear  
weapons which might have to be reconfigured for tactical use in order to ensure that the  conventional 
systems are not short-circuited (contourn‚ i.e. defeated)26. As we have seen,  the debate on the 
potential military use of nuclear weapons (possibly in support of  conventional weapons) is both 
embryonic and extremely problematic.   However, the redesignation of conventional weapons as both strategic and pre-eminent  has already taken place. It figures in second place (after Europeanisation of 
both  equipment and structures) as one of the six main priorities of the new loi de  programmation 
militaire . Conventional systems are now designated as being  primarily intended for use in certain 
conflict situations. They are considered as  strategic weapons on condition that, in a European context, 
they confer on their  political masters autonomy in three key areas: intelligence gathering, C3I, 
transport  and logistics. We shall examine below (2.3) the evolution of French military planning  under 
these heads. While European considerations are not the only ones involved in this  strategic review, 
they are constantly cited as the main reason for it. Of the six specific scenarios which are sketched out 
as contexts in which France's conventional forces will  be used, by far the most significant ones are in 
Europe or its immediate hinterland27.  Thus it is no exaggeration to state that the revolution in French 
strategic doctrine which  was introduced in 1994 is the direct result of the new international situation in 
general,  and of the new European situation in particular.    
 
2.3. Conventional weapons for power projection  
 
This radical revision of strategy is being paralleled at the level of procurement. The  proportion of the 
defence budget allocated to nuclear forces, which rose to over 30%  in the mid-1980s and dropped off 
to 24% by 1990, fell precipitately to 11% in 199528.  The picture is clearer if we look at actual 
expenditure.   Year Overall Budget Nuclear forces  1987 169,200 MF 36,050 MF  1991 194,548 
42,952  1992 195,268 40,446 1993 197,916 26,906 1994 193,828 23,164 1995 194,262 22,387  Since 
1990, most of the nuclear programmes planned in the 1980s have been either cut,  postponed or 
drastically reduced. The additional resources are going into four priority  areas: command and control 
systems; intelligence; transport and strategic mobility;  power projection. The strategic assumption 
behind all these priorities is the same. These  new weapons systems will be required for use in 
missions connected with peace-keeping  or peace enforcement in theatres such as former Yugoslavia. 
They will be used in  conjunction with both WEU and NATO forces, most often under a United 
Nations  mandate. The lion's share of defence equipment expenditure is going to systems for use by the 
Army (Leclerc heavy tanks, VLB light armoured vehicles, Tigre anti-tank  helicopters); the Navy 
(nuclear aircraft-carrier Charles de Gaulle - launch in 1999  with a decision on a second boat to be 
taken in 1997; naval version of Rafale to be  deployed in 1999; a new generation of TCD landing craft; 
new La Fayette-class  frigates and the development of the Franco-British anti-aircraft frigate Horizon); 
the  Air Force (Future Transport Aircraft; Rafale; KC 135 FR refuelling aircraft; Mirage  2000-D 
ground attack fighter etc). The objective for the army is to be able to "project"  to distances of around 
5,000 kms from their bases, as many as 40,000 men (two  divisions) which, given the need for 
replacement, means the training of up to  120,00 men (out of a total army contingent of 227,000) for 
power projection  purposes29. As for the navy, the aspiration is to contribute to the creation of a  
unified European navy with power projection capabilities across the globe30. The air  force, by 
contrast, will have its role reduced as a result of three factors. First, the  declining need for large 
numbers of fighters and bombers; second, the  disproportionately large share of its budget which will 
be accounted for by  the Rafale (currently estimated at 200 billion francs) and the heavy price tag for 
the  Future Large Transport aircraft (currently estimated at 35 billion francs)31. We shall  examine in 
the next section of this chapter the significance of the fact that many of  these systems (the ones 
marked in bold above) are being produced by one European  consortium or another. It is important to 
stress at this juncture that many of these  weapons systems have been devised, reconfigured or 
prioritised explicitly in view of  the requirements of the new crisis-driven combat missions of the post-
war era32. It  would be an exaggeration to suggest that moves towards European integration in defence  
are the principal driving force behind these new deployments. It is no exaggeration to  conclude that 
the shift towards usable conventional systems is indissociable from the  new strategic thinking about 
the future of combat - linked to crisis management - in  Europe and its hinterland or from moves to 
create a genuinely European military  capacity with which to approach that combat and to handle those 
crises.  One of the most significant features of recent French procurement plans is the emphasis on 
intelligence-gathering capacities and command and control systems. The most painful  lesson learned 
in Paris from the Gulf War was the fact that, as the then Defence Minister  Joxe put it, without 
American satellites, the French armies in the Gulf were effectively  "blind"33. Accordingly, ever since 
the Gulf War, France has placed the utmost priority  on the acquisition by Europe of an autonomous 
space-based intelligence and command  capability. This question naturally raises the much broader one of relations between the  two sides of the Atlantic, which we shall deal with under 2.5. below. But 
there is no  doubt that France's new strategic approach, involving the acceptance of multiple  combat 
missions in a European context, has provided a major impetus behind her plans  for a European space 
capacity. The French space budget has decupled since the end of  the 1980s, rising from just over 
500m francs in 1987 to 1,977m francs in 1989 to  5,017m francs in 1995. Between 1994 and 1995, the 
space budget rose by 23.4%34.  Despite programme setbacks (ambitious plans for a European space 
shuttle - Hermes -  were drastically scaled back in 1992), and a constant shortfall between French 
projects  and European support, the picture is nevertheless relatively positive. The Ariane launcher  
rocket has established itself as a major international competitor. The SPOT and ERS  observation 
satellites are heavily in demand throughout the world. The HELIOS military  observation satellite, 
which will give France/Europe (limited) autonomous intelligence data  is set for launch in the summer 
of 1995. The WEU satellite monitoring centre at Torrejon  in Spain was inaugurated in April 1993. 
French plans for radar observation satellites  (OSIRIS, ZENON, CERISE) are well advanced. The 
military telecommunications system  SYRACUSE has been functioning for several years. A variety of 
other space-based  projects are on the drawing board. The biggest problem with all this space activity 
is  the relative reluctance of France's European partners to involve themselves with political  
enthusiasm and financial commitment. Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain have associated  themselves 
in a minor way with a number of programmes, particularly HELIOS. But  Germany and especially 
Britain have hitherto fought very shy. At the time of writing  (April 1995), however, there are signs 
that Germany, now freed of constitutional  obstacles to overseas military involvement, is reconsidering 
its decision to participate  in HELIOS35. It is clear to all analysts that, without German inputs, the 
participation of smaller European countries will remain minimal - Italy's and Spain's continued  
participation in HELIOS is reported to be pegged to Germany's decision. To a  large extent the entire 
space programme seems dependent upon major European  cooperation. In presenting the 1995 defence 
budget to Parliament, François L‚otard  expressed growing optimism and confidence that Germany 
would soon join in the  European space programme in a major way36. France continues to assert that, 
even  without European participation, it will continue its ambitious space programme on a  purely 
national basis. Although this could be interpreted as bravado, the energetic  pursuit of a major military-
space programme seems to be a case of France taking a  European lead years ahead of her partners and 
eventually, through the sheer force of her  example, dragging them along with her. Certainly, the WEU 
seems keen to acquire its own  extensive space facilities, but remains dependent on the French lead37.   
The French shift towards emphasis on conventional weapons for power projection  constitutes a radical 
departure in defence policy from the heyday of "Gaullism".  Clearly, at doctrinal, programmatic and 
operational levels, this shift represents a de  facto convergence between French defence planning and 
that of WEU and NATO.  Convergence (rather than integration) is the essential feature. However, if 
convergence  continues, there will inevitably come a time when it is difficult to distinguish between 
the  main features of the defence policies of the countries involved. Before we examine the  extent to 
which France, at institutional level, has adopted a genuinely more European  profile, it is necessary to 
assess the progress of Europeanisation in the more general  field of arms procurement and the arms 
industry.      
 
2.4. The Defence Industry and Procurement  
 
It is in the area of the armaments industry that the discourse on the European imperative  becomes 
universal. Without exception, the major texts on weapons procurement for the  21st century stress not 
only the desirability but the inevitability of European cooperation38. The Livre Blanc even goes so far 
as to state that "no major  future conventional armaments programme seems able to escape the logic of  
cooperation" (p.192). Yet, despite these repeated assertions, France still produces  75% of her weapons 
systems within the confines of the Hexagon39, and the economic,  social and political problems 
involved in industrial restructuring and conversion are very  considerable. However, given the sheer 
scale of the "American challenge" (the recent  merger between Martin-Marietta and Lockheed created 
a giant bigger than the entire  French aeronautics industry and equivalent in turnover to one third of the 
entire  European aeronautics industry) it is argued in Paris that, if Europe is to retain an  independent 
armaments sector, it has no alternative but to create a European  armaments industry. On that principle, 
there seems to be little disagreement. The costs  of sophisticated weapons programmes, particularly in 
terms of R & D, are rising  exponentially. The CEO of Martin Marietta, Norman Augustine calculated that, by the  year 2043, on current trends, the US Defence Department would only be able to afford  
one single combat aircraft - to be used four days a week by the Air Force and three days  a week by the 
Navy40. In a major speech on procurement policy in September 1994,  Fran‡ois L‚otard outlined a 
three point plan: "First, to consolidate our national industry by  giving it the necessary means to forge 
European alliances (my stress) [...]; Next, to  conduct these European-wide industrial alliances in the 
tightest possible synergy with  the cooperation programmes. Finally, to agree on a division of labour 
among the  European states for non-strategic programmes"41. How much of this is actually  happening?  
For the moment, the answer has to be that a lot is being said, but a lot less is being done.  One of the 
reasons is that, given the strategic nature of the sector and the State interests  involved, mergers of the 
American type are simply not possible - at least in the short  term. Neither Germany nor France is 
likely to abandon Deutsche Aerospace or  A‚rospatiale to the rude vagaries of the market. What is 
being sought are  cooperation agreements and these are notoriously lengthy to negotiate. One positive  
sign is the agreement reached at the Franco-German summit in Mulhouse in May 1994, to establish a 
Franco-German Armaments Agency (FGAA) whose main priority in the first  instance will be to 
standardise equipment procurement for the Eurocorps and, thereafter,  for the emerging European army. 
The Maastricht treaty called for the creation of a  European Armaments Agency (EAA) and it was 
hoped that WEU would take the  initiative. In the event, despite the transfer to WEU of the former 
IEPG, through the  creation of WEAG, the structural problems were too hard for WEU to resolve at 
European  level42. It therefore fell, as so often, to a Franco-German initiative to get the ball rolling.  A 
permanent FGAA cell is being established in 1995 with a view to the launch of a  fully-fledged 
structure in early 1996. The Germans and the French are trying hard  to interest the British and the 
Italians in establishing a genuinely European Agency43.  Meanwhile, Franco-German cooperation is 
increasing. In addition to the creation of  Eurocopter (a 50-50 consortium of A‚rospatiale and MBB), 
which is constructing both  the Tiger and the NH-90 new generation helicopters, the latter in 
conjunction with Agusta  (I) and Fokker (NL), Franco-German cooperation is central to the Future 
Transport  Aircraft (FTA) and also to the future Modular Armoured Vehicle (light tank) as well  as to a 
large number of smaller projects. France is heavily involved wih Britain (and  Italy) in the 
development of the Horizon class frigate, the first ever example of a  major joint naval procurement 
programme, and also in discussions over missile  development (Matra and British Aerospace) as well 
as in the nuclear discussions  referred to earlier. These are small but significant steps. The road towards 
a general  European armaments industry is long and riddled with obstacles, but France is doing at  least 
as much of the running as any other country. Decisions such as those of the UK to  purchase further 
American transport planes rather than to await the European FTA (even  though Britain has still not 
ruled out participation in that project) or of the Netherlands to  purchase American Apache helicopters 
rather than European Tigers (a decision which may  also soon be taken by the UK), are seen in Paris as 
regrettable but not fatal. The lesson of  the Rafale decision appears to have been well learned. This 
author was told by a senior  official in Paris that Rafale will be the last major weapons system to be 
built solely in  France44. It remains to be seen how soon and how successfully a European armaments  
industry will emerge. That it must emerge is taken, in Paris, for granted. 
2.5. Structural and Institutional reorganisation  
 
The strategic and programmatic changes we have just analysed have been accompanied by  a radical 
restructuring of France's defence institutions. This has involved two main  thrusts. First, internally, the 
armed forces have been regrouped in new inter-service  command structures to allow for an integrated 
approach to the new combat missions of  the post-Wall world. Second, externally, France has entered 
into a variety of agreements  with her European partners (in some instances via WEU, in others on a 
bilateral basis) to  form integrated military units for specific purposes. All of these developments have 
been  the direct result of the European debate. Internal restructuring has been far-reaching and  is still 
evolving. The main feature has been the break-down of the former rigid divisions  between the services 
- which are now organised in three main inter-service commands:  Europe, Overseas and Special 
Operations. This shift has been paralleled in budgetary  terms, the defence budget being broken down 
into inter-service "modules". Even the  centuries old separate "‚coles de guerre" have been merged into 
a Collège Interarmées de  Défense45. The three services have each been broken down into "organic 
groupings"  or "force reservoirs" from which the inter-service commands can summon up the  
necessary mix of forces for a given situation. Force reservoirs for the army, for  instance, comprise 
three structures: the Corps blind‚ m‚canis‚, based in Lille; the Force  d'Action Rapide; and the Eurocorps. All of these are now optimally configured for  intervention, if necessary in Europe. The 
CBM has recently been enhanced by a  special air-mobile brigade of helicopters specifically 
configured for European  intervention46. The most politically visible of the new structures is, of course,  
the Eurocorps which is now conposed of troops from five nations: Germany, France,  Belgium, Spain 
and Luxemburg47. It will be fully operational under NATO and/or WEU  hats from the autumn of 
1995. In addition, France is in the process of establishing, with  Italy and Spain, various integrated 
force structures (air, land and sea) possibly leading to  a Mediterranean Rapid Reaction Force48. 
Moreover, after the Franco-British summit in  Chartres in November 1994, it was agreed that the two 
countries would establish a joint  "Euro Air Group" based at High Wycombe to coordinate 
international and European missions of various sorts. The first commander is a French general49. 
France has  thus situated herself at the heart of a European network of integrated military units  
involving all the main countries of the EU. For a country which once held the rejection  of integrated 
command structures to be a point of principle, this is a considerable shift.  The object of most of this 
activity, it seems clear, is gradually to create the de facto  bases for a European military entity, 
probably based on WEU. At a recent colloquium  organised by the Centre d'Etudes et de Perspectives 
Strat‚giques, Europe Minister Alain  Lamassoure outlined France's vision of the security requirements 
of a "European  Europe". He foresaw three stages. First, a European security guarantee for Europe.  
Lamassoure argued that the main risks to European security (essentially destabilisation to  the East and 
South) presented no risk to the USA and had therefore "decoupled the threat"  as between the two sides 
of the Atlantic. The French minister painted a rosy picture of  genuine progress through CFSP and 
WEU and insisted that, for France, the 1996 IGC  must be essentially focused on the creation of this 
common defence and security policy.  The second stage would be a revised American assurance in 
which "the Alliance will be  transformed into a Euro-Atlantic Alliance between equal partners (stress 
added)". The  third stage would be a "joint Russo-American co-assurance" based on a complex  
interlocking network of security guarantees between the USA, Europe and Russia.  Whatever the 
element of wishful thinking, or even idealism in this vision, it does seem  clear that it is a scenario 
which now commands very widespread support across the  French political spectrum50.  It poses quite 
starkly the question of ongoing relations with NATO. The more NATO  seems to be searching around 
for a new role, the more France seems to become actively  involved in the internal discussions. So 
much has been written about this issue (much of  which clouds the reality) that it is difficult to attempt 
to interpret France's intentions with  any real clarity. Broadly speaking, it would seem that the strategy 
is a long-term attempt  to foster the development of a radically rebalanced transatlantic relationship, in 
which  NATO will re-emerge as a new Atlantic partnership with two roughly equal pillars. For almost 
fifty years, France has been somewhat alone in Europe in pursuing this dream.  As Alfred Van Staden, 
David Chuter and Johaness Bohnen have shown in the present  volume, there is still, within Europe, 
considerable resistance to the realisation of that  dream. But there is also growing support for it outside 
France. The Germans and the  British, the latter especially under the (unfamiliar and unwelcome) 
influence of an  entirely new attitude in Washington, are moving, at different speeds, towards a more  
open acceptance of the historical inevitability of such a development51. As a result of her  active 
manoeuvring since the end of the Cold War, France has put herself in an strong  position to emerge as 
the main player in that elusive European defence entity - if and  when it finally emerges.   Conclusion 
France is intensely committed to the creation of an integrated European defence structure  and to a 
common foreign and security policy. Throughout the period of the Cold War, and  particularly from 
the 1960s onwards, while never losing sight of the objective of a  European security entity, France 
nevertheless pursued policies which stressed  autonomy and national decision-making processes. This 
began to change in the  1980s, but since 1989, there has been rapid and significant movement. 
Conceptually,  "defence" is being replaced by "security" as the guarantor of stability, and security is  
interpreted both as a collective endeavour and as a collective goal. Doctrinally, where  both nuclear 
and conventional weapons are concerned, there have been important shifts in  the direction of 
convergence, sharing or even integration as between France and some of  her European partners. In 
terms of force missions and military involvement, the previous  record of immobilism has been 
replaced by an almost frenetic activism. And virtually none  of this activism is unilateral. France is the 
largest single contributor to UN missions  throughout the world. In terms of weapons development and 
procurement, the picture  is increasingly coloured by a seemingly irresistible move towards European 
cooperation.  In terms of medium to long-term objectives, the vision of an increasingly autonomous  
European defence entity tied in to intricate new security treaties with both the USA and  Russia is becoming the object of a new consensus. Strictly speaking France may not yet have abandoned her 
national defence structures and programmes. But the evolution of  defence thinking at every level is 
increasingly conditioned by the supposition that,  sooner or later (and preferably sooner) France's 
entire approach to questions of  defence and security will be increasingly meshed with that of her 
European  neighbours. To that extent, French defence policy has already been profoundly  affected by 
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